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Hundreds of years of mass pollution have brought the
environment to the forefront of the discourse on international law.
With the growing realization that pollution is harming the planet, a
greater emphasis is being placed on environmental issues as
evidenced by the Rio Conference in 1992. While commercial and
international trade law developed and evolved over centuries,'
international environmental law is relatively new and almost
completely reactive. The established trade laws, such as the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), are beginning to conflict
with efforts at invoking environmental legislation.
The prevailing assumption is that stronger international law
will make the world a better place to live by improving human rights,
economic prosperity, and security from conflicts, etc. However,
many of these laws are beginning to conflict with each other. As
these conflicts arise, values are being placed upon certain areas of
law. For example, the "worth" of environmental law is being
relegated by the "higher worth" of trade. This view is seen in various
GATT Dispute Panel findings.2 Most recently, the World Trade
Organization (WTO)3 has noted that past panel reports seem to limit
the environmental clause under GATT4 by applying it narrowly to
I See EsTIENNE CLEIRAC, THE ANCIENT SEA-LAWS OF OLERON, WISBY,
AND THE HANsE-TOwNS, STILL IN FORCE, (Guy Miege trans., T. Basset, 1686)
excerpts from LES US & COUTUMES DE LA MER, (discussing the early trading and
shipping laws of towns in France, Sweden and the Hanseatic League). See Gerald
A. Bunting, GATT and the Evolution of the Global Trade System: A Historical
Perspective, 11 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT 505,506-512 (1996)(discussing the
development of a global economy, international trade policy, and law).
2 US-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 1994 GATTPD LEXIS 7, DS29/R,
June 16, 1994.
3 The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the body in charge of enforcing
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). See generally Timothy A.
Harr, WTO Dispute Settlement Provisions, in THE GATT, THE WTO AND THE
URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS ACT, 579 (Harvey M. Applebaum & Lyn M.
Schlitt eds., 1995)(supplying documents that establish the WTO and its powers).
4 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947, Oct. 30, part II, art.
XX(g), 61 Stat 5, A3, A61, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, 262 [hereinafter GATT].
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"restrictions on the export of tradeable goods that could be exhausted
as a result of their exploitation."5 These cases set a dangerous
precedent that must be more closely observed because these rulings
are an assault upon higher environmental standards. Potentially they
mark the beginning of a great loss of sovereignty for nations.
I. Introduction
This Paper explores the tension developing between
environmental concerns and trade law by examining the law and
reasoning used in the recently decided United States- Standards for
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline6 and the subsequent
appeal.7 This Paper will demonstrate that the few areas within GATT
law that allows for environmental restrictions to override trade
regulation are being read narrowly to negate the effect. These narrow
interpretations of Article XX8 will potentially effect the ability of
5 United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
1996 GATTPL LEXIS 3, WT/DS2/R, Jan. 29, 1996, at para. 3.60.
6 Id.
7 United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
WT/DS2/AB/R, Apr. 29, 1996 (Report of the Appellate Body)[hereinafter
Appellate Body Report].
8 Article XX elucidates the General Exceptions to the GATT law. The
significant provisions concerning environmental concerns are as follows:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in
a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international
trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent
the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of
measures: ... (b) necessary to protect human, animals or plant
life or health;... (g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible
natural resources if such measures are made effective in
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption...
GATT, supra note 4, art. XX, 61 Stat 5 at A60, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262.
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states to legislate domestic environmental standards regardless of the
WTO's rhetoric to the contrary.
The Paper will first discuss the facts of the Gasoline Case, the
basic arguments surrounding the regulations developed by the
Environmental Protection Agency [EPA] to implement the Clean Air
Act [CAA], and more importantly the United States' appeal which
focused exclusively on the environmental aspects of GATT law.
Secondly, the paper will analyze the impact that the Panel Report and
Appellate Body Report will have on the sovereignty of nations in
other areas of regulation. The Paper will demonstrate that the WTO
has done an incredible injustice by narrowly reading the chapeau to
Article XX of GATT, thereby compromising and leaving uncertain
the ability of nations to strengthen their environmental standards and
other regulations. Thirdly, the Paper will examine the ramifications
of this decision and analyze how the WTO Appellate Body Report
failed to seize the opportunity to tie trade with sound environmental
policy. Lastly, the Paper will layout a possible plan to remedy the
second class status to which trade has relegated environmental law.
II. The Gasoline Case Against The United States
A. Facts of the Case
In January 1995, Venezuela requested the United States to
hold consultations regarding the EPA's "Regulation of Fuels and Fuel
Additives - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline."9
These consultations did not resolve the conflict. Accordingly,
Venezuela requested the Dispute Settlement Body [DSB] of the WTO
to form a panel to hear their claim against the United States.'0 The
DSB formed a panel in mid-April 1995. That same day Brazil
requested to hold consultations with the United States regarding the
9 See United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
supra note 5, at para. 1. 1.
10 See id.
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same legislation.1 Brazil's consultations were fruitless and they also
requested a panel be formed to hear their matter. 12 The DSB
combined the panels at the end of May 1995."3
The issue before the panel was the CAA's 1990 amendment,
14
which required the EPA to promulgate regulations aimed at
decreasing the amount of pollutants present in gasoline. 5 The
regulations would decrease toxic and ozone creating pollutants from
vehicle emissions. 6 In particular, the EPA established "nine ozone
non-attainment areas." These areas contain cities that had a
population of over 250,000 in 1980 and that also had the highest
ozone pollution during 1987-89.17 While conventional gasoline could
be sold to the rest of the United States, only reformulated gasoline
could be sold in the non-attainment areas. 8
Reformulated gasoline has stricter chemical composition
requirements which reduces harmful emissions. The combustion of
gasoline emits pollutants into the atmosphere, and by reducing these
pollutants, the non-attainment areas would see a decrease in ground
level ozone-forming volatile organic compounds.' 9 However,
reformulated gasoline costs more to produce because it is a higher
quality.
Requiring reformulated gasoline to be sold could result in
refiners, blenders, and importers selling lower grade fuels, which
contain conventional fuel components "dumped" in from the highly
restricted reformulated fuel, to the rest of the United States to offset
See id. at para. 1.1 and 1.2.
12 See id. at para. 1.2.
13 See id. at para 1.3.
14 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k)(1994).
15 See id. § 7545(k)(1).
16 See United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
supra note 5, at para. 2.1.
17 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k)(10)(D).
18 See United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
supra note 5, at para. 2.2; 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k)(1), (10)(E), (10)(F).
19 See United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
supra note 5, at para. 2.1, 2.3.
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the price difference.2" Such "dumping" would violate the CAA's
provision prohibiting the dumping of pollutants from reformulated
gasoline into the conventional gasoline sold to rest of the United
States.2' This would also offset the environmental benefits achieved
by using the reformulated gasoline in the first place.
The CAA aimed to establish limits that refiners, blenders, and
importers could not exceed in relation to the "pollutants attributable
to gasoline sold or introduced into commerce in the calendar year
1990. ..,22 Therefore, separate individual baselines would be
established for all refiners, blenders, and importers. However, if the
EPA determined there was insufficient data to calculate an individual
baseline, then a statutory baseline would apply.2 3 The statutory
baseline fluctuated because of the seasonal statutory baseline defined
under the CAA and determined by the EPA.24
The EPA proceeded to ascertain the composition of 1990
gasoline to calculate a "baseline," which would act as a measuring
tool to compare conventional and reformulated gasoline in the
future.2 ' The crux of Venezuela and Brazil's complaint against the
United States was the way in which EPA established the baseline
because EPA used separate methods for domestic and foreign
suppliers of gasoline.
The "Gasoline Rule" mandated that a baseline, reflecting the
pollution levels of 1990, be set for each individual domestic
refinery. 6 To determine the domestic baseline, the EPA developed
three sets of criteria.27 The first set defined the baseline using the
20 See United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
supra note 5, at para. 2.4.
21 See id. at para. 2.4; 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k)(8).
22 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k)(8)(A).
2 See United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
supra note 5, at para. 2.4.
24 See 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k)(10)(B)(I) and (ii).
25 See United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
supra note 5, at para 2.5.
26 See id. at para. 2.6.
27 See id.
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quality and volume data of the individual refineries.28 The second set
(used when there is insufficient quality and volume data) required
domestic refiners to derive their baseline from the 1990 gasoline
blendstock29 quality data and production records.0 If not enough data
was available to use either the first or second set of criteria, then "a
domestic refiner must turn to a set third set of criteria which was
derived from the post-1990 gasoline blendstock and/or gasoline
quality data model..."'
The EPA then adopted a two-fold approach toward reducing
pollutants in reformulated gasoline.3" First, for a three year period,
starting in January 1995, the "Simple Model" would be in effect.33
Under this program, reformulated gasoline sold by domestic refiners
would be bound to qualities that were no less stringent than the
refiners individual quality of 1990."4 Additionally, importers could
not use an individual baseline and were forced to abide by the
statutory baseline.35 Starting in January 1998, the "Complex Model"
would be in effect. This model created statutory emission
28 See id.
29 "Blendstock is unfinished gasoline which has to be blended [with higher
quality gasoline] in order to be sold as finished gasoline." Id. at para. 3.16 n.62.
30 See id. at para. 2.6.
31 Id.
32 See id at para. 2.9.
33 See id
34 See id.
35 See id. The United States argued that because blenders and importers
receive gasoline from so many sources that it would be impossible for them to
establish individual baseline data, therefore they were assigned a statutory baseline.
See First Submission of the United States, Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, available in LEXIS, GATTPD file, 1995 [hereinafter First
Submission of the U.S.]. However, the United States also established an exception
that allowed importers, who, in 1990, imported 75 percent of their product from
an "affiliated foreign refinery," to be considered a domestic refiner so that these
refiners could establish an individual baseline. See 40 CFR 80.91(b)(ii); see also
United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, supra note
5, at para. 6.3. This exception became known as the 75 percent rule. See id at
para. 2.7.
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requirements that would apply to all producers of reformulated
gasoline, and abandoned the individual baselines.36
The EPA proposed an amendment to the Gasoline Rule in
May 1994 which would have allowed individual baselines to be
established for foreign refiners and importers because many parties'
comments were taken into consideration during the rule making
process, in May 1994?7 However, this proposal would only apply to
reformulated gasoline and would place further controls on foreign
refiners in an attempt to assure that the laws were not being
circumvented by inaccurate data.38 However, Congress passed
legislation that did not fund the proposal.39
B. Argument of Venezuela and Brazil and the United States
Response
Venezuela and Brazil argued the Gasoline Rule did not fall
within the General Exceptions article4' of GATT 1994, 4' and was in
opposition to the Most Favored- Nation Treatment article,42 and the
National Treatment on Internal Tax and Regulation article.43
Venezuela and Brazil further argued the Gasoline Rule violated the
Preparation, Adoption and Application of Technical Regulations by
Central Government Bodies, Article 2 of the Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade." Moreover, Venezuela asserted the Gasoline Rule
36 See United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
supra note 5, at para. 2.10.
37 See id. at para. 2.13.
38 See id.
39 See id.
40 See GATT art. XX.
41 See United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
supra note 5, at para. 3.1 (a),(b).
42 See GATT art. I.
43 See id. art. III.
44 See United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
supra note 5, at para. 3.1(c).
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caused damages to the country under the Nullification article of
GATT.
45
1. Most Favored-Nation Treatment
Venezuela and Brazil alleged the Gasoline Rule violated the
Most Favored-Nation Treatment [MFN] clause because it allowed
importers who bought 75% of their product from a foreign affiliated
refiner46 to establish an individual baseline through Methods 1-3. 47
Venezuela and Brazil argued this gave a small number of countries
who exported a sizeable amount of their gasoline to the United States
an unfair advantage based purely on ownership and volume of the
gasoline sold in violation of MFN.4' However, the United States
asserted that since no importer met the 75% Rule, the matter should
not be decided by the Panel.49
2. National Treatment on Internal Tax and Regulation
Venezuela and Brazil alleged the Gasoline Rule gave less
favorable treatment to its gasoline versus domestic gasoline products
because imported gasoline had to meet more stringent regulations
(under the statutory baseline), while a like product produced in the
United States could be sold as long as it met the individual baseline.5"
They argued the individual baseline for domestic producers and the
45 See GATT art. XXIII: l(b).
46 See discussion supra note 35.
47 See United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
supra note 5, at para. 6.18.
48 See id.; see also GATT art. 1:1.
49 See United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
supra note 5, at para. 6.18-6.19.
so See id at para. 3.12.
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statutory baseline for foreign producers was in violation of Article
111:4 of GATT. s1
Brazil defined the discrimination in three respects. First,
domestic refiners were allowed to establish an individual baseline
higher than the statutory baseline with which foreign refiners were
required to comply. 2 Second, "the statutory baseline was more
stringent than the average of the individual baselines for refineries
located in the Eastern and Gulf Coast states (where virtually all
Brazilian gasoline was sold) because of the inclusion in the national
average of the strict 1990 California standards."53 Finally, domestic
refiners could make a greater profit because those domestic refiners
producing gasoline cleaner than their baseline were able to import
gasoline with pollutants above the statutory limit and blend the two. 4
The United States claimed that on average there was no
discrimination against foreign producers because the statutory
baseline was based on an overall average of all gasoline used in the
51 See id. Article 111:4 states that:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported
into the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded
treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like products of
national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and
requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale,
purchase, transportation, distribution or use. The provisions of
this paragraph shall not prevent the application of differential
internal transportation charges which are based exclusively on
the economic operation of the means of transport and not on the
nationality of the product.
52 See United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
supra note 5, at para. 3.15.
53 Id.
54 See id For example, because an individual baseline is an average only of
1990 pollutants in the gasoline, the domestic producer could be currently producing
gasoline with less pollutants than their average of that year. This would allow that
refiner to purchase more polluted gasoline (at a cheaper cost) and blend it with their
domestically produced gasoline, so that the refiner has more gasoline that meets the
individual baseline.
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United States in 1990."s Therefore, according to the Untied States,
"overall domestically produced gasoline had to be at least as clean as
foreign gasoline since roughly half of the domestic gasoline would be
'cleaner' and roughly half would be dirtier than gasoline using the
statutory baseline."'56 The United States further argued the Gasoline
Rule actually benefitted foreign producers. Since the majority of
foreign producers could not establish a baseline, they would have
been prohibited from importing any gasoline altogether: 7 The United
States also advanced a number of other arguments.5
C. The United States' Defense '9
The key to the United States defense was Article XX of
GATT which enumerates the general exceptions to international trade
law." The United States asserted that Article XX was the controlling
law, and if the Gasoline Rule was found to violate certain articles of
GATT law, then the Panel should rely on Article XX.
55 See id. at para. 3.17.
56 Id
57 See id. The United States used this argument even though logically the
United States could not prevent gasoline coming into the United States because a
total bar would be in opposition to GATT.
58 The United States argued that the Gasoline Rule only applied to imported
gasoline that was being brought into the United States and sold by importers in the
United States because importers were the first company that could be regulated by
United States law. See id. at para. 3.18. In addition, the United States stated that
imported gasoline was treated the same as domestic refiners with limited 1990
operations (and data to establish an individual baseline). See id. at para. 3.19.
59 The United States also submitted an argument based on Article XX(d),
but that argument rested on whether the Gasoline Rule constituted law, regulation,
or requirement. However, that argument is outside of the scope of this Paper.
60 See GATT art. XX, supra note 8.
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1. Article XX(b)
Under Article XX(b), the United States maintained the
Gasoline Rule sought to reduce air pollution "to protect human,
animal or plant life or health; ... ,6, The United States asserted air
pollution and ground-level ozone caused cancer and numerous other
health problems.62 Since the purpose of the CAA and its 1990
amendment is to "protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air
resources. . ,"' the United States alleged this met the spirit of
Article XX(b).6 Furthermore, the United States claimed that using
the baseline method fulfilled the "necessary" portion of Article XX(b)
because it was the "quickest and fairest way" to protect human,
animal or plant life or health.6 5 The United States believed:
If a single baseline were used for all conventional
gasoline, then all producers whose gasoline was dirtier
than this baseline for certain gasoline qualities would
need to change the characteristics of their production
to meet the standard for those qualities, and those
producers whose gasoline was cleaner than the
baseline could degrade down to the baseline.66
Venezuela maintained the United States had not proved the
Gasoline Rule was the least restrictive regulation to achieve the stated
environmental policy objectives of the United States.67 Furthermore,
Venezuela developed, in its opinion, four alternative methods that the
United States could have employed to obtain greater air control
61 Id.
62 See First Submission of the U.S., supra note 35, at para. 73.
63 Id. at para. 75.
64 See id.
65 See id at para. 79, 80. See also United States-Standards for Reformulated
and Conventional Gasoline, supra note 5, at para. 3.40.
6 United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
supra note 5, at para. 3.40.
67 See id. at para. 3.45.
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
quality without discriminating against foreign refiners.6' Brazil added
the United States did not present convincing evidence that foreign
refiners could not establish individual baselines using Method 3, and
it appeared that the United States had simply made an assumption. 9
2. Article XX(g)
The United States also argued the Gasoline Rule was justified
under Article XX(g).7" The United States advanced an interesting
theory that clean air is an "exhaustible resource" because air could
become "chronically contaminated" by prolonged pollution.7'
Furthermore, since air moves over great distances, pollutants also
move and carry pollution to many other areas damaging other parts
of the environment.72 The Untied States insisted that by preserving
the air, the CAA will help save other natural resources by lessening
pollution in lakes and streams and minimizing destruction of crops
and forests.7'
D. The Panel's Findings
The Panel went through all the arguments presented by
Venezuela and Brazil and ruled on all the individual arguments under
each and every article relied on.
1. Most-Favored-Nation Treatment
The Panel agreed with the United States that there was no
need to examine Venezuela and Brazil's claims under Article 1: 1, the
MFN provision under GATT, because the 75% Rule did not apply to
68 See id.
69 See id. at para. 3.49.
70 See id. at para. 3.58.
71 Seeid. at para. 3.59.
72 See id.
73 See First Submission of the U.S., supra note 35, at para. 126.
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any parties. Finally, it did not appear as though the rule would come
into effect in the future.74
2. National Treatment on Internal Taxation and
Regulation
Under Article 111:4, National Treatment on Internal Taxation
and Regulation, the Panel noted that Venezuela and Brazil were
required to show that, "(a) law, regulation or requirement affect[ed]
the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation,
distribution or use of an imported product; and (b) treatment accorded
in respect of the law, regulation or requirement that is less favorable
to the imported product than to the like product of national origin."75
The Panel then went into a lengthy discussion of what constituted
"like products."'76 The Panel found that both domestic and imported
gasoline fit within the definition of "like products."
The Panel then examined the second prong of the test to
determine the potential favorableness that domestic gasoline
received.77 The Panel found domestic gasoline received, "in general,"
better treatment than imported gasoline.78 The Panel recognized the
United States' argument that because the statutory baseline was an
average of all gasoline in 1990, some importers received more
favorable treatment than other importers, therefore, offsetting the less
74 See United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
supra note 5, at para. 6.18, 6.19.
75 See id. at para. 6.5.
76 The concept of "like products" has been difficult to ascertain and although
different Panels have tried to come up with consistent ways to develop the
definition of "like products," the definition has only become more confusing over
time. See, e.g., Japan-Tariff on Imports of Spruce- Pine- Fir (SPF) Dimension
Lumber, B.I.S.D. 36S/167, para. 3.29-3.53 (adopted July 19, 1989); Spain-Tariff
Treatment of Unroasted Coffee, B.I.S.D. 28S/102, para. 3.5-3.13 (adopted June 11,
1981).
77 See United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
supra note 5, at 6.9, 6.10.
78 See id. at para. 6.10.
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favorable treatment.79 The Panel noted that no less favorable
treatment on the whole was not sufficient in light of past panel
reports.8" Furthermore, the Panel stated that even on the whole,
imported gasoline was being treated less favorably than domestic
gasoline." Finding the United States in violation of Article III:4, the
Panel then investigated whether the Gasoline Rule fell within the
scope of Article XX exceptions to be justified.
3. General Exceptions
i
a. Article XX(b) and (d)
The Panel stated that since the United States was "invoking an
exception" to GATT, it "bore the burden of proof in demonstrating
that the inconsistent measures came within [Article XX(b)]. '' 2
Moreover, the Panel required the United States to prove:
(1) that the policy in respect of the measures for which
the provision was invoked fell within the range of
policies designed to protect human, animal or plant
life or health;
(2) that the inconsistent measures for which the
exception was being invoked were necessary to fulfill
the policy objective; and
(3) that the measures were applied in conformity with
the requirements of the introductory clause of Article
XX.
8 3
79 See id. at para. 6.14.
80 See id. citing United States - Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930,
B.I.S.D. 36S/345, 1989 GATTPD LEXIS 2, at para. 5.14 (adopted Nov. 7,
1989)(rejecting the belief that "balancing more favorable treatment of some
imported products against less favorable treatment of other imported products).
81 See id. at para. 6.15.
82 See id. at para. 6.20.
83 Id. (emphasis in original).
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Although the Panel agreed the United States proved the first element,
it questioned the necessity of the regulations used by the United
States to accomplish its policy objective.84
The Panel first adopted a definition of "necessary" that was
used in a prior GATT Panel report.8 5 They interpreted "necessary" to
mean no other alternative law could be developed that was not in
violation of GATT law, or an alternative that "entails the least degree
of inconsistency with other GATT provisions." If the measure (law
or regulation) was necessary then it is valid.86 The Panel then
examined and discussed other ways in which the policy could have
been implemented without being inconsistent with GATT. s7 The
Panel found the United States did not meet its burden under Article
XX(b). In addition, the Panel decided that the United States claim
under Article XX(d) was not applicable.88
b. Article XX(g)
Likewise, the United States bore an enormous burden in
proving the measure was justified under Article XX(g). Once again
the Panel laid out the elements the United States had to prove:
(1) that thepolicy in respect of the measures for which
the provision was invoked fell within the range of
policies related to the conservation of exhaustible
natural resources;
84 See id. at para. 6.21, 6.22.
85 See id. at para. 6.24.
86 Id (quoting United States - Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, B.I.S.D.
36S/345, 1989 GATTPD LEXIS 2 at para. 5.26 (adopted Nov. 7, 1989)).
87 See id. at para. 6.24 - 6.29.
s8 See id. at para. 6.32, 6.33.
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(2) that the measures for which the exception was
being invoked - that is the particular trade measures
inconsistent with the General Agreement [GATT] -
were related to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources;
(3) that the measures for which the exception was
being invoked were made effective in conjunction
with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption; and
(4) that the measures were applied in conformity with
the requirements of the introductory clause of Article
Xa.
89
The Panel decided the United States' policy met the first
element of the test.9" The key to this element rested on how "related"
the measure was to the conservation principle of the policy.9' The
Panel turned to the Herring and Salmon case to deal with the issue of
the meaning of Article XX(g).92 The Herring and Salmon Panel
believed that Article XX(g) was in place to prevent trade from
impinging upon countries conservation polices aimed at exclusively
protecting exhaustable natural resources.93 The Herring and Salmon
Panel also believed that while a law "did not have to be necessary or
essential to the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource, it had
to be primarily aimed at the conservation of an exhaustible natural
'9 Id. at para. 6.35 (emphasis in original).
90 See id. at para. 6.37. Although the Panel did find in favor of the United
States on this point, the Panel seemed to agree with Venezuela's assertion that
clean air was not an exhaustible natural resource like petroleum or coal, but since
a past panel had found that a renewable resource could be construed to be an
exhaustible natural resource, it allowed air to fall under the meaning of Article
XX(g). See id. at para. 6.37, 6.38.
91 See id. at para. 6.39.
92 Canada - Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and
Salmon, 1987 GATTPD LEXIS 8, at para. 4.6 (March 22, 1988).
93 See id.
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resource to be considered as 'relating to' conservation within the
meaning of Article XX:(g) (sic.).
9 4
The Gasoline Case Panel closely examined whether the
baseline establishment methods which the Panel found to be in
violation of Article III:4 were in fact "primarily aimed at the
conservation of natural resources."95 The Panel, using new
terminology, found "no direct connection" between the United
States' environmental policy of improving its air quality and giving
less favorable treatment to imported gasoline.96 In addition, the Panel
explained that:
The [] lack of connection was underscored by the fact
that affording treatment of imported gasoline
consistent with its Article III:4 obligation would not in
any way hinder the United States in its pursuit of its
conservation policies under the Gasoline Rule.
Indeed, the United States remained free to regulate in
order to obtain whatever air quality it wished.97
Lastly, the Panel emphasized it did not inquire into the "desirability
or necessity" of the United State's environmental policy concerning
the CAA.98 The Panel reiterated that WTO parties can set any
environmental agenda they wish, but it must be done within the
restrictions enumerated in GATT. 99
94 Id.
95 United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
supra note 5, at para. 6.40.
96 See id.
97 Id.
98 See id. at para. 7.1.
99 See id.
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E. The United States' Reaction to the Panel Decision
The United States expressed its disappointment with the
decision and stated the Clinton Administration would not back down
from enacting environmental laws.' Furthermore, because the
United States was in the midst of an election, the decision drew some
harsh criticism from Patrick Buchanan, a Republican presidential
candidate.' The United States Trade Representative (USTR),
Mickey Kantor, pointed out that the WTO panel report had 'no force
under US law, but he neglected to note that if the United States failed
to abide by the decision it would be a politically costly move.'0 2 The
United States was one of the major proponents for establishing the
WTO. 10 3 If the United States ignored the ruling it would weaken the
structure that it helped to create. By ignoring rulings against it, the
United States had more to lose than to gain because the United States
had numerous cases before the WTO with much more money at stake
than what was before the Gasoline Panel. Therefore, it was assumed
the United States would simply appeal the ruling.Y On February 21,
1996, the United States did appeal.
F. The United States' Appeal
The United States' appeal was based solely on the argument
that the panel erred in finding the Gasoline Rule was not justified
1o0 See WTO backs Venezuela in Dispute Over Gasoline, THE HOUSTON
CHRONICLE, Jan. 18, 1996, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNEWS file.
101 See Evelyn Iritani, First WTO Ruling Provides Grist For Opponents
Citing Threat to U.S. Law, Los ANGELES TIMES, Jan. 19, 1996, available in
LEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNEWS file.
102 See Frances Williams, US May Appeal Against WTO Ruling, FINANCIAL
TIMES (London), Jan. 19, 1996, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNEWS
file.
103 See generally William F. Buckley, Has the WTO Threatened Us?,
BUFFALO NEWS, Jan. 27, 1996, at C3.
104 See generally Editorial, The WTO Rules, JOURNAL OF COMMERCE, Jan. 23,
1996, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, CURNEWS file.
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under Article XX(g).' °5 The appeal centered on whether the baseline
rules are "related to" conserving clean air under Article XX(g).'06
Venezuela and Brazil reiterated some of their previous claims
in favor of the panel decision. Furthermore, Venezuela claimed that
for a law to be "'relating to' or 'primarily aimed at' conservation [ ]
the measure [must be] both: (i) primarily intended to achieve a
conservation goal; and (ii) ha[ve] a positive conservation effect."' °7
The Appellate Body took a more logical approach to
examining GATT articles. Instead of trying to develop concrete
meanings behind many of the terms in Article XX, the Appellate
Body looked toward international laws concerning construction to
find meaning within the law."°8 The first question the United States
wanted clarified was whether "measures," which is used in the
chapeau of Article XX and Article XX(g), applies to the entire
Gasoline Rule or to just the establishment of the baseline section of
the rule."0 9 The Panel decision was unclear whether the whole
Gasoline Rule or just the baseline establishment method violated
Article III:4.' The Appellate Body surveyed statements made by all
the parties establishing, in their understanding, that it was only the
baseline establishment method rules which were in violation of
Article III:4."' With this established, the Appellate Body explored
the reasoning the Panel used to find the Gasoline Rule was "not
primarily aimed at the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources."112
The Appellate Body highlighted the Panel finding that air was
an exhaustible natural resource, and that the United States policy to
prevent depletion of this resource was not inconsistent with Article
105 See Appellate Body Report, supra note 7, at II.A.
106 See id.
107 Id. at II.B.
108 See id. at III(B).
109 See id. at III(A).
110 See id.
III See id. at n.29.
112 Id. at III(B).
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XX(g). 113 The Appellate Body quoted a paragraph from the Panel
Report which seemed to demonstrate the Panel posed an incorrect
question.' 4 The Panel appeared to have questioned whether the
Gasoline Rule, which they concluded resulted in less favorable
treatment under Article II1:4, was "primarily aimed at" conserving air
quality, rather than whether the baseline establishment methods (or
"measures") were "primarily aimed at" the conservation goal."' The
Appellate Body found a severe error with the Panel analyzing its own
legal conclusion rather than the baseline establishment methods under
Article XX(g). Moreover, the Appellate Body stressed that the Panel
interpreted the United States' measures were not "necessary" under
Article XX(b); however, the Panel also seemed to extend this analysis
to Article XX(g) where it is not appropriate."
6
The Appellate Body looked to the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties which states that a treaty should be interpreted "with
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in the light of its object and purpose.""' 7 Using this
construction, the Appellate Body showed that each clause of Article
XX uses different qualifiers, and it appears that was the intent of the
WTO members."1 Because Article XX(a), (b), and (d) use the word
"necessary," a higher standard, and Article XX(c), (e), and (g) use
"relating to," a lower standard, the Panel should not have applied the
"necessary" standard to Article XX(g). 9 Considering Article 31 of
the Vienna Convention with the chapeau of Article XX and Article
XX(g), the panel concluded that "the purpose of including Article
XX(g) in the General Agreement was not to widen the scope for





117 See id. (quoting Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23,
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commitments under the General Agreement do not hinder the pursuit
of policies aimed at the conservation of exhaustible resources."'20
Consequently, the Appellate Body found there was a "substantial
relationship" between the baseline establishment methods and the
conservation requirements of the Gasoline Rule which meets the
second element of the test put forth by the Panel.'
The Appellate Body continued the analysis that the Panel
ended when it concluded the United States had not proved the' second
element under Article XX(g). 2  The Appellate Body began to explore
the last half of Article XX(g) which states, "if such measures are
made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption."'2 While the United States wanted the
Appellate Body to interpret the clause to mean that measures cannot
be placed "solely" on imported gasoline, Venezuela and Brazil argued
the measure must also be primarily aimed at "domestic production
and consumption."'24 Furthermore, Venezuela believed the measure
must not only have a "purpose," but must also have a positive
effect. "'25 The Appellate Body employed the construction of plain
language to interpret the clause.'26 The Appellate Body found:
[t]hat the clause "if such measures are made effective
in conjunction with restrictions on domestic product
or consumption" is appropriately read as a
requirement that the measures concerned impose
restrictions, not just in respect of imported gasoline
120 Id. (quoting Canada Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring
and Salmon, supra note 92, at 98, para. 4.6).
121 See id. See also supra note 89 and accompanying text.
12 See Appellate Body Report, supra note 7, at III(C). See supra note 89 and
accompanying text.





but also with respect to domestic gasoline. The clause
is a requirement of even-handedness in the imposition
of restrictions, in the name of conservation, upon the
production or consumption of exhaustible natural
resources.
127
The Appellate Body decided the baseline establishment methods
sufficiently restricted domestic refiners. 2 ' Furthermore, the Appellate
Body stated that it did not interpret this clause as an "effects test;"
meaning that the measure does not have to produce effects for it to
fall within the exception of Article XX(g) as Venezuela argued.
129
Accordingly, the baseline establishment methods fulfilled the third
element of the test.
The Appellate Body moved to examine the baseline measure
within the context of the fourth element; the chapeau of Article
XX.30 The Appellate Body stated, "[t]he chapeau is animated by the
principle that while the exceptions of Article XX may be invoked as
a matter of legal right, they should not be so applied as to frustrate or
defeat the legal obligations of the holder of the right under the
substantive rules of [GATT]."'' The Appellate Body broke the
chapeau into three parts the measure would have to pass.'32 The
Appellate Body understood the three terms to not be mutually
exclusive, and they more or less required an overall assessment of the
motives of the measure. 3' Immediately thereafter, the Appellate Body
127 Id. at 23.
128 See id. at 24.
129 See id. One of the reasons for this rationale was that, especially with
environmental measures or laws, it can take a long time for the effects to be seen.
See id.
130 See id. at IV. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
131 Id.
132 See id. The three terms that the Appellate Body broke down were: "(a)
'arbitrary discrimination' (between countries where the same conditions prevail);
(b) 'unjustifiable discrimination' (with the same qualifier); or (c) 'disguised
restriction' on international trade.
133 See id.
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stated that the United States had other options available to it in order
to effectuate the policy goals of the Gasoline Rule. Incredibly, the
Appellate Body seemed to return to the same "necessary" test that it
faulted the Panel for using incorrectly.
134
The Appellate Body rebuked all the arguments the United
States put forward for its rationale behind the development of the
baseline establishment methods.135 The Appellate Body did not know
of any actions by the United States government to rectify their claim
that it would be too difficult, if not impossible to determine foreign
refiners' baselines. 136 In addition, the Appellate Body did not like
that the United States was concerned with the physical and financial
problems domestic refiners would face if a statutory baseline was
imposed, but was not concerned with the problems of foreign
refiners. 13' Finally, the Appellate Body reasoned that the Gasoline
Rule was discriminatory and not justified under the chapeau because
the United States did not attempt any administrative scheme
involving all the parties, or did not consider the costs of adhering to
the statutory baseline to foreign refiners. 38 The Appellate Body
decided, "these two omissions go well beyond what was necessary for
the Panel to determine that a violation of Article 111:4 had occurred in
the first place. The resulting discrimination must have been foreseen,
and was not merely inadvertent or unavoidable."'' 39
III. Analysis and Possible Implications of the Gasoline Case and
Appeal
This was the first case decided under the new WTO structure
and it left much to be desired. It is astounding that "experts" in trade
law, who are the judges on the Panel, would have rendered such a
134 See id. See text accompanying supra notes 113-120.






perfunctory decision in the first case. The undoing of the United
States in both cases was whether the baseline establishment methods
were "necessary." The Panel and the Appellate Body seem to be
saying that if these adjudicatory bodies can find another method to
enact the policies a country is trying to accomplish, then the measure
will never fall within the spirit of the chapeau of Article XX. While
the Appellate Body gave a broader reading of Article XX(g) in
relation to othet reports, it turned around and put a noose on prior
interpretations concerning the chapeau of Article XX.140 Under the
United States - Canada Tuna panel report and the United States -
Imports of Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies report, to avoid
being viewed as "unjustifiable" or "arbitrary," the measures under
review were required to apply to all foreign countries to avoid the
measure being viewed as "unjustifiable" or "arbitrary.141
Furthermore, to avoid falling within the "disguised restriction" the
measure need only be publicly announced .1' The Appellate Body
chose to ignore these prior interpretations, and has not only given a
different meaning to these decisions but they also extended the reach
of the WTO's jurisdiction by establishing a quasi - "necessary" test
for the chapeau of Article XX.
1 43
This should be of great concern for members of the WTO.
While the WTO dictating the legality of environmental regulatory
140 See Anna B. Snoderly, Note, Clearing the Air: Environmental Regulation,
Dispute Resolution, and Domestic Sovereignty Under the World Trade
Organization, 22 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 241,292-93 (1996).
141 See id. at 293.
142 See id.
143 But see Jeffrey Waincymer, Reformulated Gasoline Under Reformulated
WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures: Pulling Pandora Out of a Chapeau?, 18
MICH. J. INT'L L. 141, 170-76 (interpreting the Appellate Body Report concerning
the chapeau to apply a "foreseeability" and "reasonableness" standard). Nowhere
in the Report does the Appellate Body state that it is using the standards of
"foreseeability" or "reasonableness." Rather, it appears that the Appellate Body is
adopting an "any other possible means" or "necessary" test. Meaning that if there
is "any other possible means" to realize the policy goal of conserving an
exhaustible resource, those means must be employed.
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methods is startling, this decision could have more far reaching
effects because trade is so interrelated to other areas of law within a
country. In the future, WTO may be legislating for countries over a
number of expansive issues. For example, if the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) does not approve a drug for sale in the United
States because it fears that significant testing has not been done, yet
it approves a similar domestic drug, the WTO may call into question
the entire FDA framework for adopting drugs.'
The meaning of this decision can not be underscored enough.
The Appellate Body upheld countries' rights to enact legislation to
protect human health and the environment, but it also stated clearly
that the WTO may decide what methods a country may use to
implement the legislation. Although the WTO is still in its infancy,
the Panel and the Appellate Body in this case have marked out a very
wide area within a countries domestic law which will now come
under its adjudicatory control. For the United States, this means that
any of the government agencies under the executive branch which are
charged with developing regulatory schemes and enforcing those
regulations now fall within the auspices of the WTO.
Since the WTO has oversight of laws passed by Congress and
signed by the President, the people of the United States should be
concerned because the "experts" sitting on these panels and the WTO
officials that appoint them are not elected 45 .The Panel Report and
Appellate Body Report mark the first time that regulations developed
for the enforcement of laws passed by the United States' Congress are
being adjudicated by people who are not elected by the citizens of the
United States.'46 This creates concern because the United States
government is accountable to its citizens, but the WTO "experts" are
bound to upholding "mutually advantageous arrangements directed
to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to
the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade
144 The assumption in this scenario is that the drug would be considered a
"like" treatment for similar ailments in patients.
145 See Snoderly, supra note 140, at 300.
146 See id.
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relations... ""'7 It goes without saying that the WTO's goal's are not
necessarily in the best interest of the United States.
It is not clear whether the United States intended to relinquish
this much sovereignty. However, it is clear that some governmental
officials did fear such problems with the WTO. The WTO Dispute
Settlement Review Commission Act, sponsored by Senator Robert
Dole, was set up to review all decisions against the United States.'48
The United States' reaction to upcoming decisions which signal the
United States' willingness to stay within the structure of the WTO
since the rationale for adhering to this decision is that it will benefit
the United States far more than what the United States lost.
149
In addition, the Appellate Body may have closed the door to
merging environmental issues with trade because many
environmental measures impair trade. Furthermore, since there are
so many different interests competing to set political agendas, it is
"difficult to construct environmentally sustainable, politically viable,
and internationally enforceable environmental measures that do not
affect foreign producers differently than domestic producers."'50 Even
if one agrees with the Appellate Body Report, the "experts" clearly
did not recognize the opportunity they had to elaborate on the proper
balance between trade and the environment. Had the Appellate Body
elaborated on the importance of the environment in relation to trade,
or simply stated in their decision that as long as some effort is made
to mitigate the potential economic harm to foreign countries,
environmental regulations will be found consistent within the
meaning of the chapeau of Article XX, then the Appellate Body
147 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Item 1, preamble,
reprinted in JOHN H. JACKSON, ET AL, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS: DOCUMENT SUPPLEMENT, (3rd ed. 1995).
148 S. 1438, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 1434, 104th Cong. (1995).
149 With the recent loss of the United States case against Japan concerning
Eastman Kodak and Fuji Film, it will be interesting to see whether there are more
calls within the United States to leave the WTO.
ISO Snoderly, supra note 140, at 295.
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would have developed some precedent that would have alleviated the
fears of environmentalists and isolationists.
The Appellate Body had an opportunity to establish
environmental law within the sphere of trade to give it some effect
within trade decisions, but they chose not to attempt this. Perhaps the
Appellate Body was simply working within a system that needs to be
reformed. Environmentalists have long been concerned with the
narrowly defined environmental articles of GATT in the face of
overly broad trade articles.' There are ways in which these two sets
of rules can be harmonized, and international environmental law
strengthened. However, the Appellate Body stopped short and left
many questions unanswered. More importantly, the Appellate Body
has significantly narrowed the overall effect of the chapeau of Article
xx.
IV. Solutions to Strengthening International Environmental Law
Environmentalists want international environmental law
strengthened, or at least domestic environmental regulations
safeguarded because they fear trade liberalization grants greater
access to markets that spurs growth causing mass waste production
and unsustainable development.'52 Furthermore, lesser environmental
standards translate into a comparative advantage which in turn places
pressure upon countries with stronger environmental regulations to
reduce those requirements. 5 3 In addition, some environmentalists
would like to see the linking of trade restriction to transboundary
environmental problems.'54 Some nations are concerned about how
the WTO will deal with prior treaties that use trade restrictions to
151 See Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin, Market Access, Competitiveness,
and Harmonization: Environmental Protection in Regional Trade Agreements, 21
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV 265,328 (1997).
152 See DANIEL C. EsTY, GREENING THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND




strengthen international environmental treaties. 5 5 Conversely, some
experts believe the whole WTO system may be in danger of
collapse.'56
The WTO's Committee of Trade and Environment (CTE) is
supposed to be exploring all the issues this Paper discussed and many
more.'57 However, it is impossible to achieve consensus because the
CTE is composed of each member of the WTO.'58 While the CTE
developed a paper framing the arguments concerning a number of
trade and environment issues, it has done little else.'59 Clearly this
committee must take more of an advisory role, and develop more
analysis on issues relevant to the WTO. 6°
It has been noted that a "relatively large number of
international environmental pacts [] contain provisions dealing with
trade, [while] international trade agreements rarely address
environmental matters."'161 The logical conclusion is that "while it is
155 See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, International Trade and Protection of the
Environment: The Continuing Search for Reconciliation, 91 AM. J. INT'L L.268,
281.
156 See Philip M. Nichols, Extension of Standing in World Trade
Organization Disputes to Nongovernment Parties, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 295,
300-02 (1996); see also G. Richard Shell, The Trade Stakeholders Model and
Participation By Nonstates Parties in the World Trade Organization, 17 U. PA. J.
INT'L ECON. L. 359, 361. Nichols and Shell agree that:
The rigidity of the dispute resolution process in the World Trade
Organization, [ ], presents a special danger. To the extent that the World
Trade Organization forces countries to reform their laws so as to exalt the
value of free trade over other values, the empirical legitimacy of national
laws could be eroded. Countries asked to choose between obedience to
the World Trade Organization and having empirically legitimate laws may
choose to ignore the World Trade Organization.
Nichols, at 300 (citations omitted).
157 See Schoenbaum, supra note 155, at 269.
158 See id. at 270.
159 See id. at 269.
160 See id. for a more elaborate explanation of the future duties of the CTE.
161 Id. at 282.
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not necessary to protect the environment to facilitate trade, it is often
necessary to regulate trade to protect the environment."' 62 This is
precisely the reason why it will be very difficult to achieve full
harmony between the two sets of law. While trade law has something
to offer environmental law, namely an enforcement mechanism,
environmental law has nothing to offer trade law.
One way in which the two may become more linked is by
amending GATT to create a new general exception under Article XX
which would allow prior multilateral environmental treaties to retain
their clauses which utilize trade restrictions to enforce environmental
standards.'63 By bringing these multilateral treaties within the GATT
structure they would become part of the GATT law which must be
observed. Furthermore, because the environmental treaties were
drafted by environmental experts, presumably, they would take into
account factors that trade experts could not. However, using
international environmental treaties still may not strengthen the role
of the environment within trade because the panels and appellate
bodies are comprised solely of trade experts.
Lastly, the WTO could expand the expertise of the experts on
the panels or allow nongovernmental groups to advise the experts.
According to the Dispute Settlement Understanding [DSU], the
agreement that sets the rules and procedures for the panels that hear
cases, "panels shall be composed of well-qualified governmental
and/or nongovernmental individuals, including [people in the field of
trade].' ' 4 Professor Nichols urges that this clause be utilized to bring
experts from other fields to add perspective to the panels.'65
Furthermore, Article 8(2) states that; "Panel members should be
162 Id,
163 See id. at 284.
164 Nichols, supra note 156, at 328. See also Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, art 8(1), reprinted
in JOHN H. JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS,
(3rd ed. 1995) [hereinafter DSU].
165 See Nichols, supra note 156, at 328.
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selected with a view to ensuring the independence of the members, a
sufficiently diverse background and a wide spectrum of
experience."' 166 These two clauses provide the justification for
appointing experts in environmental science to these panels to give
greater insight into some of the effects that panel decisions may have.
These recommendations will not cure the inevitable clash of
the two sets of law because they are in opposition to one another.
However, until there is either an intergovernmental body for
environmental concerns or a greater world movement toward
pollution control, environmental policy must be maximized through
the use of the WTO. This will require using all of these
recommendations plus many other theories.
V. Conclusion
The first Panel Report and Appellate Body Report by the
WTO have been landmark decisions in numerous ways, few of them
positive. The Panel was haphazard in its ruling by using many terms
interchangeably, using incorrect standards, and misinterpreting prior
panel decisions. While the Appellate Body did a marginally better
job, it dealt huge blows to national sovereignty, left numerous
questions surrounding the status of environmental protection, and
narrowed the General Exceptions clause of GATT significantly.
Hopefully, future Panel Reports and Appellate Body Reports will
exercise greater control of their supervisory positions, yet more
clearly define the General Exceptions clause of GATT.
16 DSU, supra note 164, at art. 8(2).
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